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## ВІДНОВЛЕННЯ В УМОВАХ СУВЕРЕННОЇ СТІЙКОСТІ ТА УПРАВЛІНСЬКА АДАПТАЦІЯ

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## RECONSTRUCTION IN SOVEREIGN RESILIENT CONTEXTS AND MANAGEMENT ADAPTATION

**Анотація.** Актуальність дослідження зумовлена зростанням масштабів міжнародної фінансової підтримки, що надається державам, які постраждали від збройних конфліктів, а також необхідністю концептуалізації процесів відновлення в умовах, що відрізняються від традиційних постконфліктних моделей. Домінантні парадигми постконфліктного відновлення формувалися переважно на прикладах інституційного колапсу, громадянських війн та крихких державних середовищ. Від Плану Маршалла до операцій з розбудови миру після завершення «холодної війни» теорія відновлення здебільшого виходила з припущення про руйнування державних інститутів або припинення бойових дій як вихідної точки.

Водночас триваюча російсько-українська війна формує конфігурацію, яка не повністю відповідає цим усталеним припущенням. Україна залишається функціонуючою суверенною державою в умовах повномасштабної міждержавної агресії, зберігаючи інституційну безперервність, макроекономічне управління та траєкторії реформ, водночас готуючись до масштабного відновлення. Така ситуація виявляє недостатньо теоретизовані аспекти досліджень відновлення, зокрема щодо інституційної стійкості та нелінійної послідовності відновлювальних процесів.

Метою статті є уточнення домінантних типологій відновлення та визначення наслідків конфігурацій стійких суверенних держав для адаптації систем управління організацією в умовах міжнародної фінансової підтримки.

У статті застосовано структурований аналітичний синтез наявних класифікацій відновлення, розроблених Світовим банком, Міжнародним валютним фондом та у межах літератури з постконфліктного врядування. У результаті аналізу виявлено три імпліцитні припущення, закладені в домінантних моделях: інституційний вакуум, крихкість як базовий стан та лінійна послідовність постконфліктного відновлення. На цій основі запропоновано концепт «контексту суверенної стійкості» для опису держав із високою інституційною спроможністю, в яких процеси відновлення відбуваються одночасно з активною обороною та інституційною адаптацією.

Наукова новизна дослідження полягає в концептуалізації стійких суверенних держав в умовах тривалої міждержавної агресії як окремої аналітичної категорії. Отримані результати розширюють теорію відновлення та формують теоретичне підґрунтя для подальших досліджень адаптації систем управління організацією в контекстах міжнародної фінансової підтримки.

**Ключові слова:** адаптація систем управління; інституційна стійкість; міжнародна фінансова допомога; постконфліктне відновлення; суверенна стійкість; Україна

**Abstract.** The urgency of the research is determined by the growing scale of international financial support provided to states affected by armed conflict and the need to conceptualize reconstruction processes under conditions that differ from traditional post-conflict models. Dominant paradigms of post-conflict reconstruction have been shaped primarily by cases of institutional collapse, civil war, and fragile state environments. From the Marshall Plan to post-Cold War peacebuilding operations, reconstruction theory has largely presupposed either the breakdown of state institutions or the termination of hostilities as its starting point.

However, the ongoing Russia–Ukraine war presents a configuration that does not fully align with these established assumptions. Ukraine remains a functioning sovereign state under full-scale interstate aggression, maintaining institutional continuity, macroeconomic governance, and reform trajectories while simultaneously preparing for large-scale reconstruction. This situation reveals insufficiently theorized aspects of reconstruction scholarship, particularly regarding institutional resilience and non-linear sequencing.

The objective of the article is to refine dominant reconstruction typologies and to identify the implications of resilient sovereign state configurations for organizational management system adaptation under international financial support.

The article employs a structured analytical synthesis of prevailing reconstruction classifications developed by the World Bank, the IMF, and post-conflict governance literature. The analysis identifies three implicit assumptions embedded in dominant models: institutional vacuum, fragility as a baseline condition, and linear post-conflict sequencing. On this basis, the concept of a Sovereign Resilient Context is introduced to describe high-capacity states undergoing reconstruction concurrently with active defense and institutional adaptation.

The scientific novelty of the research lies in conceptualizing resilient sovereign states under sustained interstate aggression as a distinct analytical category. The results expand reconstruction theory and provide a theoretical foundation for further investigation of organizational management adaptation in contexts of international financial support.

**Keywords:** institutional resilience; international financial assistance; organizational management adaptation; post-conflict reconstruction; sovereign resilience; Ukraine.

JEL codes: D02, H12, O19, M10

**Defining the General Matter and Its Connection to Important Scientific and Practical Objectives.** Post-conflict reconstruction has traditionally been conceptualized as a process emerging from rupture [1; 5]. Whether in the aftermath of

World War II or in the wake of civil wars in Africa, the Balkans, or Latin America, reconstruction theory has tended to assume a baseline condition characterized by institutional damage, governance fragility, or systemic collapse. In such contexts, international financial assistance is framed as a mechanism for rebuilding fiscal systems, restoring macroeconomic stability, and reconstituting state legitimacy.

Over the past three decades, this orientation has become increasingly focused on fragile and failed states. Empirical research, particularly in development economics, has drawn heavily on large-N datasets dominated by intrastate conflicts [2; 13]. These studies examine aid effectiveness, absorptive capacity, and growth recovery primarily in environments where governance institutions were weakened or dismantled by civil war. Consequently, the theoretical architecture of reconstruction has been built around a relatively narrow empirical foundation.

The Russia-Ukraine war challenges this architecture. Ukraine, since 2022, has faced full-scale interstate aggression from a peer state actor. Yet the country has preserved institutional continuity. Public administration systems remain operational, macroeconomic governance is coordinated with international partners, digital public services continue to function, and structural reforms — including EU alignment — have not ceased. Simultaneously, Ukraine is planning and initiating reconstruction measures before the termination of hostilities.

This configuration raises important scientific and practical questions concerning the adequacy of existing reconstruction typologies and the implications for organizational management system adaptation under large-scale international financial support.

### **Analysis of Recent Research and Publications.**

**Conflict-Based Classifications.** The literature distinguishes reconstruction contexts according to the nature of the conflict. Early post-WW2 scholarship, exemplified by analyses of the Marshall Plan, addressed reconstruction after large-scale interstate war among industrialized states. However, post-Cold War research shifted decisively toward civil wars and complex emergencies.

The World Bank, for example, identified several socio-political categories of post-conflict environments, ranging from stable states undergoing peaceful transition to cases of state erosion and failure driven by ideological or ethnic conflict [7; 19]. Similarly, the IMF developed a functional typology distinguishing between newly created states, pre-existing states with widespread institutional damage, and those with moderate disruption [14].

While these classifications acknowledge different levels of institutional disruption, the empirical focus of the literature has increasingly concentrated on intrastate conflict. Reconstruction is thus implicitly framed as a response to fragmentation of authority, erosion of bureaucratic continuity, and breakdown of fiscal management.

**Institutional Starting Conditions.** Reconstruction theory is also organized around assumptions about institutional baseline conditions. The dominant categories include failed states, fragile states, crisis states, and — more rarely — resilient states.

Failed or collapsed states are described as unable to provide basic security or reproduce the institutional conditions necessary for governance. Fragile states are those vulnerable to systemic breakdown due to weak administrative insulation or contested legitimacy. Crisis states represent acute stress environments in which institutions remain formally intact but are under severe contestation [14; 18].

Although the concept of resilience appears in recent scholarship, it is typically framed as a protective quality that prevents collapse rather than as a foundation for reconstruction [3]. The dominant paradigm assumes that reconstruction begins when institutions must be restored, redesigned, or externally engineered.

**Assistance Modalities and Sequencing.** International financial assistance is classified by modality and scale. These include technical capacity-building, concessional lending, debt relief mechanisms such as HIPC, and comprehensive liberal peace packages combining democratization and marketization. Each modality presupposes a particular institutional baseline, often characterized by limited administrative capacity [4; 17].

Traditional reconstruction models are underpinned by a sequential ontology in which conflict termination precedes reconstruction. This linear sequencing assumption, while analytically convenient, implicitly excludes configurations in which institutional transformation occurs under persistent violence [6].

**Previously Unsolved Parts of the General Problem.** The synthesis of prevailing reconstruction typologies reveals several layers of theoretical insufficiency.

At the theoretical level, reconstruction scholarship has not adequately integrated resilience into its analytical framework. Resilience is treated as a defensive attribute rather than as a dynamic condition enabling transformative adaptation. The literature also struggles to conceptualize non-linear recovery, particularly when violence persists without a clear termination horizon [11].

Empirically, the dominance of civil war datasets has narrowed the scope of reconstruction theory. High-capacity states under interstate aggression are underrepresented in quantitative and qualitative models. Consequently, aid effectiveness findings may not generalize to cases in which institutional continuity is preserved during conflict [9].

At the organizational and management level, scholarship remains underdeveloped. There is limited analysis of how public administrations adapt structurally during prolonged interstate war while maintaining reform trajectories. Questions of bureaucratic scaling, institutional memory preservation, and concurrent implementation of international standards remain insufficiently theorized.

**Article Aim.** The objective of the article is to refine dominant reconstruction typologies and to identify the implications of resilient sovereign state configurations for organizational management system adaptation under international financial support.

**Research Methods.** This article employs a structured analytical synthesis of peer-reviewed scholarship in post-conflict reconstruction, development economics, and institutional governance published between 1990 and 2024, drawing primarily from Scopus-indexed sources.

The methodological approach combines comparative typological analysis, institutional analysis, and conceptual refinement. Existing classifications developed by international organizations and academic scholarship are systematically examined and assessed against the empirical configuration represented by Ukraine.

### **Presentation of the Main Material and Justification of Research.**

**Testing the Ukraine-Type Configuration.** When assessed against these dominant typologies, Ukraine's situation presents a conceptual tension.

First, in terms of conflict type, Ukraine is not engaged in a civil war or internal insurgency but in a large-scale interstate war against a peer aggressor. Contemporary reconstruction literature rarely addresses this scenario, as most empirical analyses rely on civil war datasets. While the Marshall Plan addressed interstate war, it was implemented after total cessation of hostilities. Ukraine's reconstruction planning during active combat thus lacks a close historical analogue within dominant theoretical models [12].

Second, Ukraine does not fit the assumption of institutional collapse. Core state institutions have maintained functionality. Public administration systems continue to operate, digital governance platforms remain active, and macroeconomic management has been coordinated with international partners. The challenge is not institutional reconstitution from vacuum but institutional hardening and adaptive transformation under stress.

Third, macroeconomic governance in Ukraine contradicts the «war economy» model common in fragile-state analysis. Rather than fragmenting into informal or predatory systems, Ukraine's fiscal architecture has been sustained through structured international budgetary support. Aid functions not as a substitute for missing governance capacity but as reinforcement of sovereign fiscal systems.

Finally, the Ukraine-type configuration challenges the analytical validity of the traditional reconstruction continuum. Reconstruction planning, infrastructure recovery, and reform efforts are occurring simultaneously with defense operations. The sequencing model — conflict, then relief, then reconstruction — proves analytically insufficient. Instead, Ukraine operates within a triadic simultaneity: defense, reform, and recovery.

While Ukraine serves as the primary illustrative case, similar dynamics may be observed in other high-capacity states facing sustained external pressure.

**Toward a Refined Typology.** In light of these findings, a refined typology of reconstruction contexts can be proposed.

The first category, Institutional Collapse Contexts, encompasses cases of total breakdown requiring external institutional engineering. The second, Successor or Constitutional Contexts, involves new state formation under heavy international administration. The third, Intrastate Fragility Contexts, describes pre-existing states weakened by internal conflict but retaining partial institutional capacity.

A fourth category, which existing literature insufficiently theorizes, may be termed the Sovereign Resilient Context. This configuration involves a high-capacity sovereign state subjected to external aggression while maintaining institutional continuity. Reconstruction in this context is characterized by institutional hardening rather than institutional creation, concurrent wartime governance and reform, and financial assistance designed to preserve and reinforce sovereign administrative capacity.

The contemporary Ukrainian configuration illustrates the structural characteristics of this fourth category. Its experience suggests that reconstruction theory must distinguish between rebuilding institutions from collapse and transforming resilient institutions under sustained shock.

**Organizational Management System Adaptation in Sovereign Resilient Contexts.** While reconstruction literature traditionally concentrates on macro-level institutional reform and fiscal stabilization, significantly less attention has been devoted to the meso- and micro-level implications for organizational management

systems. This omission becomes particularly pronounced in Sovereign Resilient Contexts, where institutional continuity persists under conditions of active interstate aggression.

In collapsed or fragile-state environments, international financial assistance typically necessitates the creation or restoration of basic administrative capacity. Management adaptation in such cases is foundational and externally engineered. However, in a Sovereign Resilient Context, the challenge is qualitatively different. The state apparatus does not require reconstruction from institutional vacuum; rather, it must recalibrate and reconfigure existing management systems to accommodate simultaneous pressures: defense mobilization, reform conditionality, and large-scale international financial inflows.

This configuration generates multiple interdependent adaptation pressures that reshape the architecture of organizational management systems.

From an institutional theory perspective, Sovereign Resilient Contexts challenge path-dependency assumptions that associate institutional transformation primarily with rupture or critical junctures [15; 16]. Rather than institutional change being triggered by collapse, these contexts demonstrate how adaptive reconfiguration can unfold incrementally under sustained external shock.

Adaptive governance scholarship similarly conceptualizes resilience not merely as shock absorption but as the capacity for reorganization and structural renewal during disturbance [10]. Viewed through this lens, reconstruction in resilient states represents a process of adaptive transformation rather than institutional restoration.

Within this analytical framework, the transformation of budgetary governance emerges as a central adaptation pressure. In collapsed or fragile-state environments, fiscal systems are typically reconstructed from low-capacity baselines. In contrast, Sovereign Resilient Contexts require the recalibration of already functioning budgetary architectures. Wartime fiscal mobilization must be integrated with medium-term reconstruction planning and reform conditionality associated with international financial support. This produces hybrid governance models in which short-term liquidity management, macroeconomic stabilization, infrastructure recovery, and structural transformation coexist within the same institutional framework. Organizational management systems must therefore accommodate simultaneous temporal horizons — immediate survival and long-term development — without the institutional reset characteristic of post-collapse environments.

Accountability architectures constitute an additional layer of adaptive pressure under conditions of intensified geopolitical scrutiny. In fragile contexts, international actors often compensate for weak domestic oversight by embedding parallel monitoring mechanisms. In resilient sovereign states, however, domestic institutions remain the primary locus of legitimacy. International financial assistance thus interacts with pre-existing governance systems rather than substituting for them. Organizational management systems must reconcile enhanced donor reporting requirements, transparency standards, and audit mechanisms with the preservation of sovereign policy autonomy. This dual accountability — to international partners and domestic constituencies — generates complex governance layering that is insufficiently theorized in conventional reconstruction literature.

Administrative scalability represents another structural tension. Wartime governance frequently demands rapid bureaucratic expansion, particularly in areas

such as defense logistics, infrastructure protection, social support systems, and emergency coordination. At the same time, international financial conditionality—especially in contexts of European integration or structural reform—often requires regulatory convergence, procedural rationalization, and efficiency optimization. The coexistence of expansionary wartime mobilization and reform-driven rationalization creates systemic contradictions within organizational design. Management systems must therefore develop adaptive capacity not merely to expand or contract, but to operate under simultaneous and potentially conflicting structural logics [24].

Institutional learning and crisis memory preservation further reshape the long-term trajectory of management adaptation and emerge as strategic imperatives. Sustained external aggression requires public organizations to codify adaptive practices developed under pressure and integrate them into durable governance routines. In Sovereign Resilient Contexts, reconstruction is not a discrete post-war phase but a process embedded within ongoing institutional evolution. The capacity to transform crisis-driven improvisation into structured administrative reform becomes a defining characteristic of organizational resilience. This dimension moves reconstruction theory beyond infrastructure rebuilding toward a deeper concern with the evolution of management architectures under prolonged external shock.

Taken together, these adaptation dynamics suggest that existing reconstruction typologies insufficiently capture the organizational dimension of international financial support in resilient states. In collapsed contexts, management reform is reconstructive and externally engineered. In Sovereign Resilient Contexts, by contrast, adaptation is endogenous, transformative, and embedded within continuous institutional operation. The latter configuration demands theoretical integration of reconstruction studies with institutional resilience theory, adaptive governance frameworks, and organizational change scholarship.

Ukraine's experience illustrates this divergence. The challenge lies not in re-establishing fiscal authority from vacuum, but in recalibrating established systems to manage concurrent war financing, infrastructure rebuilding, digital governance scaling, and international integration. Such a configuration calls for a differentiated model of management system adaptation that is structurally distinct from traditional post-conflict rebuilding paradigms.

Conceptually, reconstruction contexts can be linked to differentiated management adaptation logics. Institutional Collapse Contexts demand foundational reconstruction of administrative systems. Intrastate Fragility Contexts require stabilization and incremental reform. In contrast, Sovereign Resilient Contexts necessitate adaptive transformation of pre-existing management architectures under conditions of simultaneous defense, reform, and financial conditionality. This distinction establishes the analytical bridge between reconstruction typology and organizational management system adaptation, forming the theoretical foundation for subsequent empirical investigation.

**Discussion.** The introduction of the Sovereign Resilient Context refines reconstruction theory by identifying a configuration in which institutional continuity, concurrent wartime governance, and adaptive transformation coexist. In such contexts, reconstruction does not follow collapse but unfolds within ongoing institutional operation under sustained external shock.

While Ukraine serves as the primary illustrative case, similar dynamics may be observed in other high-capacity states facing sustained external pressure. The proposed

typology therefore requires further comparative validation and empirical operationalization.

The integration of reconstruction theory with organizational management scholarship opens new analytical avenues but also necessitates further refinement of measurement tools and conceptual boundaries. The distinction between reconstructive and adaptive transformation logics warrants deeper empirical investigation.

### **Conclusions and Perspectives for Further Research**

This article has argued that dominant post-conflict reconstruction typologies inadequately capture scenarios in which sovereign states maintain institutional continuity during full-scale interstate aggression. By synthesizing prevailing classifications and testing them against the Ukraine-type configuration, the analysis has demonstrated that reconstruction theory remains structurally anchored in assumptions of institutional rupture, fragility, and linear post-conflict sequencing.

The introduction of the Sovereign Resilient Context refines reconstruction theory by identifying a configuration in which institutional continuity, concurrent wartime governance, and adaptive transformation coexist. In such contexts, reconstruction does not follow collapse but unfolds within ongoing institutional operation under sustained external shock. To the author's knowledge, reconstruction literature has not previously conceptualized high-capacity sovereign states under sustained interstate aggression as a distinct analytical category. By articulating this category, the article extends reconstruction scholarship beyond its collapse-based paradigm and introduces a differentiated understanding of institutional starting conditions.

The implications of this refinement extend beyond typological clarification. Sovereign Resilient Contexts necessitate a shift from reconstructive logics toward adaptive transformation logics in the design of organizational management systems. Rather than rebuilding institutions from vacuum, the central challenge lies in recalibrating existing administrative architectures to manage simultaneous defense mobilization, reform conditionality, and large-scale international financial inflows. This configuration establishes an analytical bridge between reconstruction studies and organizational management theory, particularly in relation to resilience, adaptive governance, and institutional change under persistent external pressure.

Future research should operationalize this conceptual refinement through comparative analysis of high-capacity states exposed to sustained geopolitical disruption and examine how management systems evolve under conditions of concurrent war financing and reconstruction planning. Such inquiry would advance a more differentiated and context-sensitive reconstruction theory while contributing to broader debates on institutional adaptation in environments characterized not by collapse, but by resilience under shock.

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